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Enthusiasm for multi-methods research can possibly be
ascribed to the prima facie promise it holds for moving be-
yond, if not resolving, seemingly intractable debates on the
relative merits of “qualitative” (historical, interpretive, etc.) ver-
sus “quantitative” (i.e. inferential statistical) research meth-
ods.1 The justification of multi-methods rests on the claim that
combining a few case studies with a larger inferential—and
not descriptive—statistical study manages to capture the
strengths of both insofar as the discovery of causal relations
is concerned. This in turn lends greater confidence that the
relationships being asserted are indeed causal. The specific
argument is that since inferential statistics allows for generali-
zation (while case studies normally do not), and case studies
are better at tracing what are called “causal mechanisms,” com-
bining the two affords us the best of both worlds.
The trouble with this is that scholars seeking to justify
multi-methods seem to assume that the question of what con-
stitutes “cause” or “causal mechanism” is unproblematic, and
the problem is limited to that of making causal claims. The
problem, in this view, is solely epistemological. Epistemolo-
gies however do not exist in vacuum; they are both supported
by and in turn support ontologies (or metaphysics), which can
roughly be defined as presuppositions or innate conceptions
about the nature of the world. An insufficient appreciation of
this leads to mutually contradictory arguments in favor of multi-
method research designs; arguments, which on reflection could
not possibly support such designs. Arguments conceding the
usual weaknesses of case studies—but nonetheless attempt-
ing to justify them—imply a metaphysics that makes it impos-
sible to portray case studies as either necessary or sufficient
in causal analysis, which in turn also precludes any justifica-
tion of multi-method research. In other words, some funda-
mental concessions—implicitly based on a specific ontology—
negate almost all subsequent justifications that could be made
in favor of case studies, and by extension, multi-method de-
signs.
The causal ontology often accepted in pointing out the
deficiencies of case studies—implicitly or explicitly—is “re-
ductionist” and “regularist,” i.e. one which respectively de-
fines causes in terms of non-causal relations and states of
affair and affirms that such non-causal relations are regulari-
ties in nature. The origins of this metaphysical view can be
traced to David Hume (1999 [1748]: 136)—hence often referred
to as “Humean.”2 The particular conception of what it means
to make ‘causal generalizations’ is a logical implication of this
ontology of causality. Moreover the idea of ‘generalization’
cannot be separated from the definition of causality here; in
other words to say that something is caused by something
else is also to generalize in a certain way, namely, by referring
to regularities. Though inferential statistics finds sufficient
justification in (and in turn sufficiently justifies) this ontology
of causality, explanations based on case studies are not con-
sistent with it. Case studies and inferential statistics cannot
logically mix if the definition of causality is reductionist and
regularist. This also applies to arguments claiming that case
studies illuminate causal mechanisms, since the only defini-
tion of “mechanism” that is consistent with this ontology is
one that sees them as concatenation of variables that occur
with some regularity, something that case studies are not
equipped to handle. Multi-methods using case studies can
therefore never be justified under this metaphysical view.
Yet (1) referring to regularities is not the only way to gen-
eralize, (2) causes do not necessarily have to contain generali-
zations, and (3) it may not be possible to reduce causes to
something more basic. In each of these three cases, one can
find sufficient justification for case studies (and also indepen-
dently for inferential statistics), but the usual arguments for
combining the two run into logical difficulties. This is because
the usual justification for multi-method designs is in fact a
confusion of distinct metaphysical views about the nature of
causation that are not necessarily complementary. How does
one know that the mechanism connecting a cause with an
effect in a particular case study is the same mechanism con-
necting causes to effects in all the other cases? What part of
the study does the causal work, the case studies or the statis-
tical analysis? If it is the case study then the statistical analy-
sis should not convince us, and if it is the statistical analysis
then the case study should not convince us. This epistemo-
logical dilemma arises because the problem is not merely meth-
odological; it involves our fundamental, and most often im-
plicit, metaphysical assumptions about the nature of the world.
Let us examine these issues in turn.
That small-N is not merely an epistemological problem
becomes evident when we ask under what definition of “cause”
should small-N be a problem for establishing causal relations.
The answer has to do with statistical theory and the Humean
conception of causation that sufficiently—though not neces-
sarily—justifies it. To understand this, let us consider the epis-
temological and methodological implications of this concep-
tion. In other words, given a Humean view, how would one go
about discovering causal relations? Now very briefly, Humean
definitions come in both deterministic and stochastic versions.
Causes precede their effects, and are either necessary, suffi-
cient, or both necessary and sufficient conditions (in the de-
terministic versions), or increase the conditional probability of
their effects (in probabilistic versions). In both cases, every
singular causal statement must be an instance of one of more
general causal laws. The singular phenomenon itself need not
be repeated as long as the unique phenomenon can be shown
to be the result of a combination of laws that recur in other
singular phenomena. Epistemologically therefore, the singular
phenomenon cannot play a role in the establishment of a causal
relationship since it is itself dependent on preexisting regulari-
ties that have already been established. Both the deductive
nomological (D-N) scheme of explanation,proposed most clearly
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by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), and Hempel’s (1942) induc-
tive-statistical (I-S) scheme follows directly from such concep-
tions of causation.
The epistemological problem is that of discovering regu-
larities when many laws are instantiated simultaneously. Un-
der ideal conditions experimentation would be the first best
method (this obviously is not unique to Humean views; ex-
perimentation as a method is consistent with almost all ontolo-
gies of causation, but interpretations of experiments would
differ depending on the definition of causality). One way to
overcome the problem of simultaneous instantiation would be
to isolate individual causes and observe their effects repeat-
edly to establish lawlike regularities. When we move from the
experimental sciences to the social or non-experimental sci-
ences, the goal remains the same, i.e. the discovery of regulari-
ties, but this time they have to be detected from purely obser-
vational data. This is where statistical models come in. Such
models try to approximate the experimental situations described
above. These models assume that the data being generated
are akin to the result of a series of independent experiments or
observations generated from mutually independent processes
where nature manipulates the independent or explanatory vari-
able under different background conditions or controls (again,
it is also possible to give other interpretations to inferential
statistics). Inferential statistics is also consistent with the defi-
nition of causes as generalizations; that is, the “regularity”
part of the definition, or alternatively the definition of causes
as “types.” The latter is obviously because insofar as it in-
forms one of average effects, generalization (over a particular
population) is built into the interpretation of inferential statis-
tics.
The link between a reductionist and regularist metaphys-
ics on one hand and inferential statistical methods on the other
should be clearer now. The impossibility of fitting case studies
into this framework should also be evident. Indeed, some prior
discussions in political science have clearly recognized this.
For example, Sartori defended comparative case studies as a
third-best method behind experiments and statistical studies
(1994:16). His argument was that though it is true when it comes
to drawing causal inferences, comparative case studies are
inferior to either experiments or statistical control, the phe-
nomena that most interest certain political scientists do not
occur enough times to lend themselves to statistical studies.
The problem with this defense is that the acceptance of the
logic of statistical inference entails that a few cases cannot or
should not lead us to believe that a cause exists. This is the
crux of Lieberson’s (1991) argument against drawing causal
conclusions from a few comparative cases (also see Sekhon,
2004). Using the example of automobile accidents, Lieberson
shows how fragile our conclusions can be as to the causes of
accidents if we rely on only a few cases, assuming that knowl-
edge of causes entails knowledge of regularities. The most
logical conclusion in this instance would be to state that given
the paucity of cases one cannot say anything about the pres-
ence or absence of causes.
Lieberson’s critique applies equally to solutions to the
problem that urge us to somehow increase the number of cases
by, among other things, performing “within case analyses” by
looking at multiple implications or consequences of a particu-
lar theory or causal statement within the same case (Campbell
1975: 184–189). But if we assume that regularities are most
basic and knowledge of causes entails knowledge of regulari-
ties, it is difficult to count multiple implications as an augmen-
tation of the number of cases. For at a given level of analysis,
each implication of any causal statement must be considered
separately. It is for this reason that statistical models require
each observation to be independent. And multiple implica-
tions of the same causal statement or theory can never be
considered independent from each other. There is a rebuttal to
Lieberson’s argument, but as we shall shortly see, it makes
sense only within decidedly non-Humean ontology of causa-
tion. Within the Humean ontology, Lieberson’s position is very
convincing indeed.
Again, early discussions seemed to have conceded this.
Still case studies were defended variously as “a first stage of
research, in which hypotheses are carefully formulated,”
(Lijphart 1971: 685), or as explications of particular cases for
their own sake in light of theory, as in Verba’s “disciplined
configurative approach,” (1967: 114–115) among others. In such
an approach the researcher seeks to explain the event with the
help of established regularities and general causal statements.
It is important to note here that though disciplined configura-
tive explanations rest on general laws, the explanation itself
does very little to strengthen or weaken the validity of the said
laws (Lijphart 1971: 692). Yet these concessions are sometimes
accompanied with arguments that cannot easily be reconciled
with the former. Thus, for example, Lijphart’s subsequent as-
sertion that such studies can be considered “crucial experi-
ments” if values on the variables are extreme is difficult to
reconcile with his statement quoted above. Why should ex-
treme values on variables in one case cause us to reexamine
our prior theory, especially since the latter could be based on a
large number of cases? The same applies for ‘deviant case’
analyses. As Mckeown (1999) has also observed in a slightly
different context, a single additional case can never, by this
logic, lead us to weaken an original proposition that is, in
Lijphart’s own words, “solidly based on a large number of
cases” (1971: 692). The problem is that some of Lijphart’s epis-
temological points about the contributions of case studies
make sense only when decoupled from his ontological orienta-
tion which seems to underlie the bulk of his other points.
Another popular defense of case studies—that such stud-
ies are better at handling determinism (Gerring 2004: 347, Munck
1998: 33)—is based on conflation of ontology with epistemol-
ogy. It is perfectly consistent to have a deterministic and
Humean view of causality—indeed, the original Humean view
was in fact deterministic and some philosophers have argued
that “Hume and indeterminism don’t mix” (Dupre and Cartwright
1988)—and still claim at the epistemological level that statisti-
cal inference is the best way to establish this causality. As
Laplace observed a long time ago, an (ontologically) determin-
istic relation can appear to be (epistemologically) stochastic
because of ignorance of all relevant laws and initial condi-
tions. It does not matter whether the view of causality is deter-
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ministic or stochastic as long as causation is reduced, and it is
reduced to regularities either deterministic or stochastic. In
both situations case studies can never be logically justified as
the “first best” method.  Similar interpretations can also be
given to the use of inferential statistics in political science. As
a result, criticisms such as Lieberson’s against the use of Mill’s
methods would still be valid. What we discover from Mill’s
methods cannot even be considered “cause” in this sense.
The reference above was to deterministic sufficient con-
ditions. But can deterministic necessary conditions justify case
studies, as Dion (1998) has argued? Dion’s argument protects
case studies against the small-N criticism only under extremely
restrictive conditions. The argument has more to do with the
problems that classical inferential statistics faces in tackling
necessary conditions than the inherent strengths of case stud-
ies. In fact it could be seen primarily as an advocacy of Baye-
sian statistics over classical statistics when it comes to neces-
sary conditions.
Since Bayes’ rule depends crucially on known probabili-
ties to determine posterior probabilities, its applicability is lim-
ited to only certain kinds of systems. To be precise, it is crucial
that the mechanism that generates prior probabilities is well-
known, and alternative hypotheses have well-known prob-
ability outcomes or likelihoods. The prior probability is a source
of great debate in both philosophy and statistics (See Sober
2002, for example). It is uncontroversial in cases of systems
where there is a clear way of assigning prior probabilities. But
it is slightly more controversial in cases where we can’t. Then
the question becomes what should the prior probabilities be
based on? Should they be based on statistical regularities,
“common sense,” case studies, or subjective opinions? As
soon as we ask these questions, we realize that we are back to
the square one. Additionally, and more pertinent to the use of
such statistics to defend small-N’s is the fact that we would
have to consider multiple hypotheses with determinate likeli-
hoods for effective statistical control; at which point the dif-
ference in terms of sample size between classical inferential
statistics and Bayesianism begins to disappear. Even this ar-
gument, as a result, cannot provide sufficient justification for
case studies.
This brings us to the final and most popular set of justifi-
cations for both case studies and their incorporation in multi-
methods research, namely, that case studies are uniquely suited
to discover or enunciate what are called “causal mechanisms,”
which statistical studies are less able to do. However, “mecha-
nism” is yet undefined. Further, of two possible understand-
ings of the concept (of mechanism), one does not provide any
justification for case studies, while the other—while sufficiently
justifying case studies—cannot easily support their incorpo-
ration in multi-method designs.
If mechanisms are defined as, “in effect, variables that
operate in sequence,” (Sambanis 2004: 288), or any variation
thereof, some of the same criticisms that we started with apply.
The difficulty of defending case studies while holding this
particular understanding of mechanisms stems from the fact
that that it implies just another version of the Humean defini-
tion extended to intervening variables. It is theoretically pos-
sible to multiply the number of steps between cause and effect
while remaining steadfastly Humean. Each link or mechanism
in a longer chain can be represented by equations that can be
construed as statements of regularity and as such the same
epistemological concerns that were raised earlier about the
confirmation of causal claims with case studies apply here too.
Various statistical models such as path models would seem to
be the natural recourse. If this is a fair representation of some
definitions of causal mechanisms, then again the sufficiency
of case studies cannot be defended.
More avenues open up once we abandon either reduc-
tionist or regularist (or both) understandings of the concept of
“mechanism.” But these latter conceptions, though equally
supportive of inferential statistics independently, cannot eas-
ily accommodate the usual manner of performing multi-method
research without running into logical contradictions.
“Singularist” definitions of causality hold that singular
events and not regularities are more basic. The definition de-
couples generalizations from the definition of causality
(Ducasse 1993; Salmon 1980, 1997). Epistemologically, there-
fore, one need not look for generalities, and the explanation of
a single event or case can count as a causal explanation. Pro-
cess tracing in case studies receives sufficient metaphysical
justification here. But this ontology presents us with a prob-
lem. Such reductionist but singularist definitions of causality
have difficulty distinguishing spurious causes from “real”
causes at the definitional level. One way of overcoming this is
to attach counterfactuals to singularist mechanisms. Counter-
factuals, however, are very sensitive to contrast spaces. The
truth condition of counterfactuals depends on the contrast
space of any explanation and therefore causality also becomes
context and contrast space dependent in this case. So, for
instance, causes of revolutions as opposed to near-revolu-
tions can be very different from causes of revolutions as op-
posed to non-revolutions, or revolution in country A as op-
posed to revolution in country B. Generalizations, if any, in
this case are “bottom up” and change based on the relevant
contrast spaces rather than “top-down” and ostensibly uni-
versal. Furthermore since singular events are more basic, there
is no expectation that generalizations will necessarily emerge.
But if we define contrast spaces with as much generality as
possible, for instance in our example above, as all possible
cases of near-revolution, and if we call answers to both kinds
of questions (the limited and expanded contrasts, respectively)
“cause,” certain problems recur at the epistemological level in
combining methods since there is no presumption that an an-
swer to one question will have any bearing on an answer to the
other. Thus though attaching counterfactuals to singular
mechanisms suffices to justify case studies, they cannot jus-
tify multi-method research.
For instance Evan Lieberman’s (2005) latest attempt to
suggest a framework for multi-method research faces this par-
ticular problem. He writes that “a nested research design im-
plies that scholars will pose questions in forms such as “What
causes social revolutions?,” while simultaneously asking ques-
tions such as ‘What was the cause of social revolution in
France?’” (2005: 436) For an answer to both questions to
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qualify as “causes” almost necessarily implies a singularist
view of causation. Under a regularist view an answer to the
second question cannot differ from an answer to the first, and
the former has to be at least a subset of the latter. His advice is
to start with a large-N analysis and then—in case of robust
and satisfactory results—“test” the model with small-N analy-
sis by choosing cases that fall within the average prediction of
the large-N model (2005: 437). Why should we expect the small-
N cases to be consistent with the large-N predictions? Even if
they are, why should we have any confidence that the average
prediction of the large-N analysis and case study research
point to the same causal relationship? In the absence of ro-
bustness Lieberman advises model building and analysis of
predictions that fall in the average, and also the outliers (2005:
439–440). The criteria for “robustness” and “satisfaction” must
be statistical; it is therefore difficult to see why lack of robust-
ness should motivate case studies. Indeed there are well-known
remedies within inferential statistics for such problems as lack
of statistical significance or any bias in a model and none of
these involve looking at case studies. Note that all the ques-
tions raised here do not imply that Lieberman is wrong, but
that the argument contains large gaps, owing to insufficient
appreciation of the metaphysical implications of methods.
Additional arguments have to be supplied to reconcile mixing
of the two methods.
Case studies also receive sufficient justification if we aban-
don a reductionist view of causation or causal mechanisms.
This would reverse the order of priority in the relationship
between regularities and causes. Instead of regularities being
signifiers or definers of causes, prior knowledge of causes
would restrict and inform the kinds of inferences one is able to
make from statistical relations. This is also an effective rejoin-
der to Lieberson’s criticism of the comparative method. This is
part of Nancy Cartwright’s argument for considering causal
“capacities” as primitive. She contends that it is the arrange-
ment of capacities in certain ways that produce regularities;
“nomological machines,” or “socio-economic machines” as
she calls them, are particular arrangements of capacities that
“in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with
repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behavior
that we represent in our scientific laws.” (1999: 50) Capacities,
further, cannot be identified by any particular manifestation.
They can be compared to qualities such as kindness or tenac-
ity that are carried by human beings. Such qualities are not
identified with any one particular behavior; instead they are
instantiated in multiple circumstances as different behaviors
all of which have in common the fact that they are displays of
kindness or tenacity (1999: 51). Socioeconomic machines are
essentially fables that illuminate important aspects of how the
world works, while capacities can be equated with morals of
such fables. The relationship between the fable and the moral
is not that of similarity but “that of the general to the more
specific…[e]ach particular is a case of the general under which
it falls” (1999: 39). This means inter alia that “satisfying the
associated concrete description that applies on a particular
occasion is what satisfying the abstract description consists
of in that occasion” (Ibid). Thus any particular arrangement of
capacities is also general, and in turn, every general capacity
finds its manifestation only in particular arrangements. Once
we understand capacities well enough (as is the case in certain
natural sciences) we can further manipulate these capacities
and arrange them in different ways to produce different laws.
As Cartwright observes, “anything can cause anything else.
In fact, it seems…not implausible to think that, with the right
kind of nomological machine, almost anything can necessitate
anything else” (1999: 72).
The epistemological consequences of this view urge us
to treat both (most) large-N statistical studies and case studies
as essentially alike in that both can be interpreted as attempt-
ing to ‘guess’ the arrangement of hypothesized capacities in
the world. Sometimes when we know about enough capacities
and other background conditions “[w]e accept laws on appar-
ently slim experimental bases…[and] the data plus the descrip-
tion of the experimental set-up deductively imply the law to be
established” (Cartwright 1999: 93). Case studies, both single
and comparative, can therefore be considered similar to fables
that substantiate morals. The fables however have to be very
carefully constructed with great attention to capacities and
their arrangements. They are necessarily concrete, but they
are at the same time general. This is precisely why studies like
John Gaventa’s (1980) of one particular locality in one country
are also general. Notice that domain restriction finds its best
justification under this ontology. In fact if we follow this logic,
restrictions of domains is imperative, since what we are de-
scribing are particular nomological machines, the very defini-
tions of which carry the connotation of restriction. This is
because as we observed earlier, it is the arrangement of par-
ticular capacities in certain orders and under certain condi-
tions that could generate laws. But domain restriction does
not mean restricted generalization. The fact that some physical
laws are literally true only within the confines of the laboratory
does not prevent them from also being general. This answers
certain criticisms of case studies based on their domain restric-
tion. Thus to say that domain restriction in case studies neces-
sarily implies limited causal force is to implicitly accept an on-
tology that cannot justify case studies in the first place.
Even in this case, however, the usual manner of combin-
ing case studies with a large-N (inferential) statistical analysis
cannot be logically supported because of the reasons pointed
out earlier. On the other hand, one way of avoiding the usual
contradictions in mixing methods would be to truly “triangu-
late” within the general framework of a case study. In other
words instead of using the usual procedures of picking one
case out of any sample, one could try to empirically describe
the arrangement of capacities (of course, in the context of prior
background knowledge of capacities) of any one case, and
then examine the implications of such an arrangement using
quantitative evidence. This would work because as Cartwright
pointed out, it is the particular arrangement of capacities that
produces regularities. But it must be a necessary preliminary
to first explain why and how the arrangement of capacities
came to be. This kind of suggestion is most relevant to the
literature on institutions in political science and sociology,
especially the ones based on single cases.
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Notes
1 Another possible but independent reason, particularly of inter-
est to those interested the sociology of knowledge is that multi-
method research, especially when used in doctoral theses signals to
potential employers competency in both statistical and others kinds
of research methods thus satisfying the largest possible coalition of
potential employers. To reiterate, this is one possible hypothesis in
need of further study, and will not be addressed further in this contri-
bution.
2 Though modern versions are significantly different from what
Hume originally may have suggested.
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Is there a multimethod consensus in comparative poli-
tics? My short answer is: not quite. For example, recently I was
updating my department’s reading list on research methods
for the comprehensive exam in comparative politics, and I added
a chapter by Lakatos (Lakatos 1970) to it and sent it to my
colleagues for feedback. One replied, “I’m especially glad to
see Lakatos added!” Another replied, “What is Lakatos doing
in there?” (Actually, my colleagues are unusually collegial.)
But there is very little consensus on any aspect of compara-
tive politics, so it is unrealistic to expect anything resembling
consensus in our subfield (España-Nájera, Márquez, and Vas-
quez 2003).
My longer answer is that there is rough agreement in prin-
ciple that multimethod work would be a good thing. There is
also agreement that, in practice, some aspects of multimethod
work are hard to pull off. But I think that there are some other
challenges in multimethod work that are not yet sufficiently
appreciated—speedbumps on the road to the great multimethod
harmonic convergence.
On the encouraging side, we agree that we can do case
studies to verify causal mechanisms or explore anomalies iden-
tified by statistical analyses or formal theories; we can do sta-
tistical analyses to test whether arguments generated by case
studies or formal theories are generally true; we can develop
formal theories to explain tendencies turned up by case stud-
ies or statistical analyses; and so on, with many variations
(Lieberman 2005).
On the discouraging side, we can agree that it is hard for
any one researcher to develop cutting-edge expertise in all
three methods, and that not being on the cutting edge can be
an obstacle to publishing multimethod work. One can over-
come this obstacle by collaborating with those who have greater
expertise in different methods, but each person tends to feel
that he or she is doing more work and getting only partial
credit for it. And there is some truth to that (Bennett and
Braumoeller 2009). These difficulties are well known and ac-
cepted. But I think there are other obstacles to multimethod
work that have not received as much attention, and yet remain
serious obstacles. The first is the mismatch between concepts
used by different approaches. The second is disagreement
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